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COMPETITION POLICY AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN EAST ASIA 
SHUJIRO URATA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
East Asia experienced rapid economic growth for several decades 
before the economic crisis of the late 1990s. In the mid-1990s, a massive 
amount of capital flowed into East Asia against the backdrop of an 
enormous increase in transnational capital transactions aided by financial 
liberalization and innovation. Foreigners invested in East Asia with an 
expectation that it would continue to register rapid economic growth. 
Additional investors followed this trend without carefully examining the 
expected return on their investments. When it became apparent to 
investors that the Thai baht could not maintain its value, they quickly 
withdrew their investments, leading to a sharp depreciation in the markets. 
This dramatic decline marked the beginning of the financial crisis in 
Thailand in July 1997, which subsequently spread to other countries. 
Both external and internal factors played a role in creating the East 
Asian financial crisis. Externally, the international financial system could 
not control the overt speculation of foreign investors. Internally, weak 
financial and corporate governance systems plagued many countries. 
Domestic firms, especially large firms with significant market power, 
invested heavily not only in their particular line of business but also in 
those of other firms. Like foreign investors, domestic firms expressed 
overwhelming optimism about the future of their particular economy and 
business. They borrowed heavily from banks and other financial 
institutions to make investments, and the weak financial sector responded 
without hesitation to finance the purchases. However, the currency crisis 
that destabilized East Asian economies left firms with huge debts and 
financial institutions with non-performing loans. 
One can attribute the internal problems directly to the lack of a well-
established market mechanism. Specifically, the lack of both transparency 
in transactions and accountability in corporate, financial, and government 
systems created massive problems in the crisis-stricken economies. 
Cronyism and nepotism rather than market forces set the rules of the game 
in making transactions. Indeed, one could say that these countries lacked 
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true competition. Recognizing these defects in their economic systems, 
policymakers and researchers in East Asia discovered the importance of 
competition policy in developing a competitive environment, which in 
turn ultimately would promote economic growth. 
This Article examines competition, competition policy, and economic 
development in developing countries in East Asia. The term “competition 
policy” is defined broadly to include not only competition law but also 
other measures such as regulation, trade, and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) policies that influence competition. Part II examines how 
competition influences economic development from both a theoretical and 
empirical perspective. Part III examines several policies that impact 
competition, namely, competition law, regulation, trade, and FDI policies. 
The discussion of each policy begins with theoretical examinations and 
then turns to empirical findings. Part IV presents some concluding 
remarks. 
II. COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Improving the competitiveness of a firm or industry is an important 
factor in achieving economic development. Economic development 
progresses as competitive firms displace non-competitive firms, thereby 
enabling an economy to utilize resources efficiently. Indeed, an 
examination of economic development patterns reveals that changes in 
industrial structures accompanied economic development, which reflects 
the changes in the patterns of industrial competitiveness. In the early 
stages of economic development, an economy tends to compete most 
effectively in labor-intensive industries like the textiles industry. As a 
result of economic development, which typically is accompanied by both 
capital accumulation and improvements in human resources, the economy 
tends to possess competitiveness in more capital intensive and human-
capital intensive industries like the machinery products industry. 
The previous discussion points to the importance of improving the 
competitiveness of a firm or industry in achieving economic development. 
An important query in the discussion of competition policy in this context 
concerns whether increased competition—which may result from an 
application of competition law, deregulation, liberalization of trade, and 
FDI—would improve competitiveness. This part discusses the impact of 
greater competition on the competitiveness of firms and industries. 
A key factor in the discussion on the level of competition and 
competitiveness is the presence (or absence) of economies of scale in 
production. When economies of scale are present, many argue that 
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competition impairs the ability of firms to improve competitiveness. This 
results from competition’s failure to allow firms to expand production to a 
level where they can realize a minimum efficient scale of production. 
Critics often present this argument in the case of small developing 
economies, where domestic markets allegedly can accommodate only a 
small number of firms. 
One may question the validity of the presence of economies of scale 
theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, a domestic market in a small 
developing country may be too small to maintain many firms, but this 
constraint no longer applies once overseas markets are taken into account, 
especially considering that many East Asian economies have increased 
their volume of exports successfully. Empirically, a number of researchers 
examined the relationship between technical efficiency and firm/plant size, 
and while many of the studies found the relationship to be positive, others 
were unable to find only evidence of a relationship between firm size and 
technical efficiency. Most studies have examined cases only in the United 
States and other developed countries, so it would be beneficial to examine 
the empirical findings of studies conducted on developing economies in 
East Asia.1 
Jeffrey Nugent and Seung-Jae Yhee found no evidence of a strong 
relationship between firm size and levels of technical efficiency in their 
study of 920 firms possessing anywhere between 5 and 299 employees in 
the Korean manufacturing sector.2 However, Yueping Wang and Yang 
Yao,3 and Albert Berry and Edgard Rodriguez4 found a positive 
correlation between firm size and productivity in their studies of 
manufacturing sectors in China and the Philippines, respectively. Both 
studies found a higher rate of productivity increase for small firms as 
compared to large firms, even though the overall level of productivity is 
lower for smaller firms. Furthermore, Berry and Rodriguez also found 
 1. See Richard E. Caves, International Differences in Industrial Organization, in 2 HANDBOOK 
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1230-35 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (citing 
examples of studies performed on developed countries). 
 2. See JEFFREY B. NUGENT & SEUNG-JAE YHEE, SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN KOREA: 
ACHIEVEMENTS, CONSTRAINTS AND POLICY ISSUES 9-10 (World Bank Institute, Working Paper No. 
37190, 2000) (forthcoming 2002 in SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMICS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL). 
 3. See YUEPING WANG & YANG YAO, MARKET REFORMS, TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES AND 
THE PERFORMANCE OF SMALL ENTERPRISES IN CHINA 6-8 (World Bank Institute, Working Paper No. 
37187, 2001) (forthcoming 2002 in SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMICS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL). 
 4. See ALBERT BERRY & EDGARD RODRIGUEZ, DYNAMICS OF SMALL AND MEDIUM 
ENTERPRISES IN A SLOW-GROWTH ECONOMY: THE PHILIPPINES IN THE 1990S 7-8 (World Bank 
Institute, Working Paper No. 37181, 2001) (forthcoming 2002 in SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMICS: AN 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL). 
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comparatively wide variations in productivity among small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs).5 
These observations illustrate the importance of the dynamic aspects of 
the relationship between firm size and technical efficiency. Bee Yan Aw 
examined the relationship between firm size and technical efficiency in 
Taiwan from the dynamic perspective.6 Using total factor productivity 
(TFP) as a measure of technical efficiency, Aw found that TFP correlates 
with firm size.7 However, by tracking firms over time using the panel data, 
Aw found that the observed relationship between TFP and firm size 
reflects the fact that highly productive firms survive and grow over time, 
regardless of their size.8 Indeed, the analysis shows that it is the market 
selection process rather than the size of the firm that has led to the 
development of highly productive SMEs in Taiwan. Aw’s finding is 
significant for East Asian competition policy: it is beneficial for countries 
to develop a highly competitive business environment, under which the 
active entry of new firms and the exit of inefficient firms take place, to 
improve technical efficiency. 
Innovation provides a source of competitiveness for a firm. As such, it 
is important to examine the impact of both competition and firm size on 
innovation. The general consensus is that large firms with market power 
tend to engage in research and development more than small firms because 
innovation is risky and subject to economies of scale. In order to finance 
risky investments, firms therefore must possess sufficient financial 
resources. In addition, research and development costs are not dependent 
upon the level of production, purportedly giving large firms an advantage 
over small firms in conducting research and development. 
The disparity between firms indicates the harmful impact of 
competition on innovation. However, one may make the contrary assertion 
that competition leads to innovation, whereby competitive pressures force 
firms to develop new technologies to survive in the market. Firms with 
comfortable profits resulting from market power possess little incentive to 
conduct risky research and development. 
Theoretically, it is unclear whether competition promotes or deters 
innovation. Empirical evidence does not completely support the view that 
 5. Id. at 9. 
 6. BEE YAN AW, PRODUCTIVITY DYNAMICS OF SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN TAIWAN 
(CHINA) 5-6 (World Bank Institute, Working Paper No. 37188, 2001) (forthcoming 2002 in SMALL 
BUSINESS ECONOMICS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL). 
 7. Id. at 13-14. 
 8. Id. 
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either firm size or market power positively impact innovation. Indeed, 
many studies show that small firms without market power actively 
participate in innovation similar to large firms. In their study of firms in 
the Chinese manufacturing sector, Wang and Yao discovered that small 
firms are particularly active in both the acquisition of technologies and 
commercialization of new products.9 David Audretsch reports that while 
large firms introduced only a slightly greater number of significant new 
innovations than small firms, small firms employed roughly half as many 
employees as large firms, yielding an average small firm innovation rate in 
manufacturing of 0.309 (compared to a large firm innovation rate of 
0.202).10 
Strong competitive pressures are very important for the diffusion of 
foreign technologies. Developing countries with a limited capability to 
develop new technologies may benefit substantially from absorbing and 
assimilating imported technologies. Indeed, Japan, Korea, and other 
countries can attribute substantial economic development and 
improvement to the successful assimilation of imported technologies.11  
Competition is important for economic development because it 
imposes competitive pressures that improve technical efficiency and active 
innovations. Indeed, the aforementioned benefits of strong competition 
appear to outweigh the benefits of large firm size and market power in 
realizing economies of scale and engaging in risky innovation. Rapid 
advances in information technology likely will reduce the benefits of large 
firm size in the future. Advances in information technology will allow 
firms to concentrate on their competitive activities or core competence 
while obtaining other necessary services either from other firms or via 
outsourcing. 
Largely attributing both the remarkable performance of the U.S. 
economy and the resilience of the Taiwanese economy during the Asian 
economic crisis to dynamic SMEs, business and policy circles now 
emphasize the importance of dynamic SMEs in a competitive business 
environment in promoting economic growth. It therefore follows that an 
 9. WANG & YAO, supra note 3, at 10-14. 
 10. DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF SMALL- AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES: 
THE UNITED STATES 123-35 (World Bank Institute, Working Paper No. 37180, 1999) (forthcoming 
2002 in SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMICS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL). 
 11. Shujiro Urata discusses technology diffusion in the Japanese textile industry, where 
competitive pressures from potential entrants forced textile producers to assimilate imported 
technologies as quickly as possible. See Shujiro Urata, The Impact of Imported Technologies on 
Japan’s Economic Development, in THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN AND KOREA: A 
PARALLEL WITH LESSONS 73, 75-82 (Chung H. Lee & Ippei Yamazawa eds., 1990). 
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effective application of competition policy promotes economic growth and 
development. 
III. POLICIES TO ENHANCE COMPETITION 
Realizing the importance of competition for achieving economic 
growth and increasing economic welfare, governments have pursued 
various measures to stimulate competition, including competition law, 
deregulation, trade and FDI liberalization, and privatization. This part 
focuses on competition law, deregulation, and trade and FDI liberalization 
policies, and examines and evaluates the current situations faced by the 
selected developing members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) community. 
A. Competition Law 
The purpose of competition law is to maintain and enhance competition 
in order to achieve economic growth and enhance consumer welfare. A 
typical competition law addresses issues such as the abuse of a dominant 
position, restrictive agreements, mergers and acquisitions, and unfair 
competition. No universal definition of the phrase “abuse of a dominant 
position” exists, but in many countries, the term “dominant position” 
refers to a situation where a firm’s market share exceeds a certain level. 
Competition law prevents a firm from abusing its dominant position. 
For example, a firm cannot increase prices to limit competition through 
practices like predatory pricing, tying, and exclusive dealing. Restrictive 
agreements, including cartel, horizontal, and vertical agreements, may 
reduce competition, but they also may increase economic efficiency. For 
example, subcontracting, which may be a type of vertical agreement is 
likely to increase technical efficiency through cooperation between firms 
in developing new products and technologies. Mergers and acquisitions 
also may come under scrutiny when deemed to limit competition. 
Furthermore, unfair competition encompasses the distribution of false or 
misleading information that harms another firm’s business interests. 
Alan Bollard’s and Kerrin Vautier’s seven concept framework is 
helpful when evaluating the current competition environment under 
competition law/ policy in developing APEC economies: (1) merger 
regimes, (2) abuse of dominant power, (3) horizontal agreements, (4) 
vertical restraints, (5) jurisdiction exceptions, (6) unfair trade practices, 
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and (7) roles, enforcement, and powers.12 Based on the information from 
Bollard and Vautier, we evaluate the competition environment by using 
the following scoring system: a full score of ten for each area that 
explicitly indicates the rules concerning the noncompetitive behavior in 
question, zero points when such rules are not stipulated, and a score of five 
for rules that do exist but suffer from a lack of clarity. 
Table 1: Competition Policy in APEC Members13 
 Merger regime 
Abuse of 
Dominant 
Power 
Horizontal 
Agreements 
Vertical 
Restraints
Jurisdiction 
exceptions
Unfair 
trade 
practices
Enforcement Total
Full score 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 70 
Australia 10 10 10  5 0 10 10 55 
Brunei      10  10 
Canada 10 10 10  5 0 10 10 55 
Chile 10 10  5  5 0 10  50 
China   5   5  10  5 25 
Hong 
Kong 10       10 
Indonesia         0 
Japan 10 10 10  5  0 10 10 55 
Korea 10 10  5  5  0 10  5 45 
Malaysia       5   5 
Mexico 10 10 10  5  0  10 45 
New 
Zealand 10 10  5  5  0 10 10 50 
PNG         0 
Philippines  10    0 10  5 25 
Singapore         0 
Taipei 10 10  5  5  0 10  5 45 
Thailand 10   5  5  0  5  5 30 
U.S.A. 10 10 10  5  0 10 10 55 
 
 
 12. See Alan Bollard & Kerrin M. Vautier, The Convergence of Competition Law within APEC 
and the CER Agreement, in BUSINESS, MARKETS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC: 
COMPETITION POLICY, CONVERGENCE AND PLURALISM 126-34 (Rong-I Wu & Yun-Peng Chu eds., 
1998). 
 13. Data collected from Ippei Yamazawa & Shujiro Urata, Trade and Investment Liberalization 
and Facilitation, in ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (APEC): CHALLENGES AND TASKS FOR 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 64-67 (Ippei Yamazawa ed., 2000). 
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Table 1 illustrates the results of this evaluation. The highest achievable 
score is seventy. As Table 1 shows, developed APEC members (included 
for comparative purposes) score high marks exceeding fifty. By contrast, 
developing APEC members score much lower. Among them, Korea and 
Taipei score relatively high at forty-five. Behind them rank Thailand 
(thirty), the Philippines (twenty-five), and Hong Kong (ten). Indonesia and 
Singapore scored the lowest with zero. For many developing APEC 
members, mergers and the abuse of dominant power are monitored while 
horizontal agreements, vertical restraints, and unfair competitive practices 
are not. In addition to this incongruity, these countries appear to suffer 
from weak enforcement of these rules. 
As far as the results are concerned, a few points should be explained. 
First, among developing APEC members in Asia, only four economies 
(Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) regulate competition. The 
other developing APEC members regulate noncompetitive behavior using 
alternative means. Second, Hong Kong and Singapore, which both scored 
low, promote competition by introducing foreign competition under 
liberalized trade and FDI regimes. One then might argue that liberalized trade 
and FDI regimes alone cannot ensure strong competition, and that 
competition law can serve as a supplement rather than simply as a substitute. 
Third, many APEC members are considering introducing competition law or 
competition policies. Fourth, important differences exist not only in the types 
of rules but also in the basic design and type of enforcement arrangements 
among APEC members. According to Bollard and Vautier, competition law 
in the United States, the Philippines, Thailand, and China is predominantly 
structure-based, while competition law in New Zealand, Mexico, Korea, 
Canada, and Australia is predominantly outcome-based.14 They further note 
that China, Thailand, and Korea rely more on administration-based 
enforcement, while the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and 
Mexico rely more on judicially-based enforcement.15 
B. Deregulation 
Deregulation covers a wide range of measures, for the term 
“regulation” encompasses any government measures that affect activities 
in the private sector. State-owned enterprises constitute a typical form of 
regulated activity, though they are by no means exclusive. Regulations 
generally fall into one of two categories: economic regulations (including 
 14. Id. at 135-36. 
 
 15. Id. 
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agricultural price restrictions and restrictions on entry into certain sectors 
like the telecommunications sector) and social regulations (including 
environmental and sanitary requirements for certain products). Generally, 
economic regulations incur efficiency costs, while social regulations are 
considered beneficial to the public welfare. However, while the 
differences between these two types of regulations seem unmistakable, 
their characterization and classification are not always so clear-cut. The 
dividing line can become blurry, for even social regulations can be created 
for, and used to provide, industry protection. 
This analysis uses three factors to evaluate the performance of 
developing APEC members on deregulation: (1) privatization, (2) market 
access, and (3) transparency.  
Privatization is a necessary condition for deregulation.16 Naturally, the 
lower the share of state-owned enterprises in gross domestic investment, 
the greater the extent of privatization. However, while privatization 
constitutes a necessary condition for deregulation, it may be insufficient. 
Even after privatization, regulators may impose various restrictions, 
including those on entry and price. In the absence of necessary information 
on those restrictions, this analysis considers “market access” for foreign 
firms as a proxy for the extent of regulations applied to these economies. 
On our scale, the highest score for market access is forty.17 Transparency 
(with twenty points) is evaluated by the information presented in APEC 
members’ individual action plans (IAPs). 
 16. The extent of privatization achieved by selected economies is evaluated using information on 
the share of state-owned enterprises in gross domestic investment compiled by the World Bank. See 
World Development Indicators 1998, World Bank (1998). 
 17. Because various restrictions are not considered due to the unavailability of necessary 
information, scores tend to overestimate the extent of deregulation achieved by these economies. 
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Table 2: Deregulation in APEC Members18 
  Privatization Market access Transparency Total 
Full score  40 40 20 100 
Australia 30 30 10 70 
Brunei 15 20  0 35 
Canada 30 35 10 75 
Chile 35 25  0 60 
China 25 25  0 50 
Hong Kong, China 35 35 10 80 
Indonesia 30 20  0 50 
Japan 35 35 10 80 
Korea 30 30  0 60 
Malaysia 25 30  0 55 
Mexico 30 30 10 70 
New Zealand 38 35 15 88 
PNG 35 25  0 60 
Philippines 35 25 10 70 
Singapore 30 35  0 65 
Chinese Taipei 30 30 10 70 
Thailand 30 30  0 60 
U.S.A. 38 35 10 83 
Average  30.9  29.4  5.3  65.6 
 
The estimated results shown in Table 2 indicate good performance 
among many developing APEC members, although it is clear that 
developed APEC members perform relatively better than developing 
members. Among developing members, the Philippines and Chinese 
Taipei earn high scores of seventy, while Brunei registers the lowest score 
at thirty-five. China (fifty points), Korea (sixty points), and Malaysia 
(fifty-five points) possess scores in-between. APEC members generally 
have achieved a relatively high level of privatization, with the exception of 
a few members such as Brunei, China, and Malaysia. Many members 
performed favorably in the area of market access, thanks to active FDI 
liberalization in recent years. Regarding transparency, members with low 
scores on privatization and market access generally scored low on 
 
 
 18. Data modified from data collected by Yamazawa & Urata, supra note 13. 
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transparency, which appears to reflect member attitudes toward 
deregulation.  
C. Trade Liberalization 
Countries often restrict imports to protect domestic producers. A 
popular argument in favor of protection in developing economies is the 
“infant industry” argument,19 which proffers that developing countries 
possess a potential comparative advantage in manufacturing industries, but 
that manufacturing industries in the early stages of development cannot 
compete with well-established competitive manufacturing firms in 
developed countries. Fledgling manufacturing industries need time and 
experience to become competitive. Accordingly, this justifies the 
temporary protection of manufacturing industries in developing countries 
from imports. Indeed many countries, including the United States, 
Germany, Japan, and Korea use import protection to develop local 
manufacturing industries. 
The infant industry argument seems highly plausible, but it raises 
several objections. First, many cases exist where “temporary” infant 
industry-protective regulations ultimately resulted in “permanent” 
protection because protected industries never became competitive. Within 
protected markets, firms do not possess incentives to improve their 
efficiency. Inefficient infant firms will ask for the maintenance of 
protection that, if granted, may reduce their competitiveness. Second, the 
fact that nurturing competitive firms takes time and resources does not 
justify government protection. If an investor identifies an infant firm with 
potential, the investor will invest in that firm. Naturally, import protection 
or any other kinds of protection benefit infant firms, but that does not 
mean that such protection is necessary. Indeed, if an infant firm encounters 
difficulty in raising funds or finding investors, it is likely the result of a 
poor financial market, which is responsible for providing long-term 
funding. Ideally, government policymakers should aim to develop 
financial markets for long-term funding and not to provide import 
protection. 
While temporary protection of an infant industry may be justified in 
some situations, the reality is that protection prevents the infant industry 
from becoming competitive. A lack of competitive pressures from both 
imports and other local firms impedes the competitiveness of infant 
 
 19. For a detailed explanation of the infant industry argument, see PAUL R. KRUGMAN & 
MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 257-59 (2d ed. 1991). 
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industries. Indeed, protecting infant industries often produces lower rates 
of both allocative and technical efficiency, which in turn impose costs on 
the economy. 
The following studies examined the impact of import protection on 
allocative and technical efficiency, with most finding that import 
protection lowers both. In their study of industry in the United States, 
Louis Esposito and Frances Esposito found that industries with low import 
penetration tend to have a high rate of profitability.20 Studies of 
developing countries produced similar findings: Jaime de Melo and 
Shujiro Urata,21 Tein-Chen Chou22 and Kyu Uck Lee23 all found similar 
relationships in their studies of Chile, Taiwan, and Korea, respectively. 
Few have studied empirically the impact of import protection on technical 
efficiency. Hiroki Kawai examined the relationship between the degree of 
openness and productivity at the macroeconomic level for twenty-eight 
countries and found that greater openness improves technical efficiency 
measured by TFP.24 Shujiro Urata and Kazuhiko Yokota examined the 
impact of import protection on TFP for Thai manufacturing industries and 
found that extensive import protection yields low productivity while 
lowering protectionist measures increases productivity.25 These studies 
clearly indicate that import protection reduces both allocative and 
technical efficiency and does not contribute to economic welfare and 
growth. 
 20. Louis Esposito & Frances Ferguson Esposito, Foreign Competition and Domestic Industry 
Profitability, 53 REV. ECON. & STAT. 343, 345 (1971). 
 21. Jaime de Melo & Shujiro Urata, The Influence of Increased Foreign Competition on 
Industrial Concentration and Profitability, 4 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 287, 287-304 (1986). 
 22. Tein-Chen Chou, Concentration and Profitability in a Dichotomous Economy: The Case of 
Taiwan, 6 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 409, 409-28 (1988). 
 23. Kyu Uck Lee et al., Industrial Organization: Issues and Recent Developments, in STRUCTURAL 
ADJUSTMENT IN A NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRY: THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE 204, 216-22 (Vittorio 
Corbo & Sang-Mok Suh eds., 1992). 
 24. Hiroki Kawai, International Comparative Analysis of Economic Growth: Trade 
Liberalization and Productivity, 32 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 373, 373-97 (1994). 
 25. Shujiro Urata & Kazuhiko Yokota, Trade Liberalization and Productivity Growth in 
Thailand, 32 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 444, 444-59 (1994). 
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Table 3: Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers for Selected East Asian Economies26 
  Primary products 
Manuf. 
products 
All 
products   
Primary 
products
Manuf. 
products
All 
products
China    Malaysia    
Mean 1980-83 46.5 50.5 49.5 Mean 1980-83 4.3 12.7 10.6 
tariffs 1984-87 33.1 41.9 39.5 tariffs 1984-87 8.6 15.4 13.6 
 1988-90 34.1 42.7 40.3  1988-90 7.7 14.8 13.0 
 1991-93 31.7 39.7 37.5  1991-93 7.3 14.7 12.8 
NTB 1984-87 17.8 7.9 10.6 NTB 1984-87 4.5 3.2 3.7 
incidence 1988-90 27.2 21.9 23.2 incidence 1988-90 1.6 3.0 2.8 
 1991-93 11.5 11.3 11.3  1991-93 1.2 2.4 2.1 
         
Hong Kong    Singapore    
Mean 1984-87 0.0 0.0 0.0 Mean 1980-83 0.1 0.4 0.3 
tariffs 1988-90 0.0 0.0 0.0 tariffs 1984-87 0.1 0.4 0.3 
 1991-93 0.0 0.0 0.0  1988-90 0.2 0.4 0.4 
NTB 1984-87 6.9 2.1 3.4  1991-93 0.3 0.4 0.4 
incidence 1988-90 0.8 0.3 0.5 NTB 1984-87 15.3 14.1 14.7 
 1991-93 0.8 0.3 0.5 incidence 1988-90 3.0 0.2 1.0 
      1991-93 1.2 0.0 0.3 
Indonesia    Thailand    
Mean 1980-83 23.0 31.3 29.0 Mean 1980-83 26.3 34.6 32.3 
tariffs 1984-87 14.7 19.4 18.1 tariffs 1984-87 28.0 32.5 31.2 
 1988-90 14.8 22.5 20.3  1988-90 33.4 43.7 40.8 
 1991-93 13.6 18.3 17.0  1991-93 26.2 41.8 37.8 
NTB 1984-87 98.9 93.1 94.7 NTB 1984-87 24.4 7.8 12.4 
incidence 1988-90 15.7 7.0 9.4 incidence 1988-90 7.9 8.8 8.5 
 1991-93 4.6 2.0 2.7  1991-93 8.8 4.2 5.5 
 
The focus now shifts to the patterns of import protection for developing 
APEC members in East Asia. As Table 3 clearly illustrates, developing 
APEC members in East Asia (with the exceptions of Hong Kong and 
Singapore, which adopted virtually free trade regimes) liberalized their 
import regimes by lowering both tariff rates and non-tariff barriers from 
the early 1980s through the early 1990s. Regarding tariff barriers, China 
and Indonesia registered significant reductions in their average tariff rates 
from the early 1980s through the early 1990s, while Malaysia and 
Thailand increased their average tariff rates only slightly.  
The incidence of non-tariff barriers declined in many East Asian 
economies. Indeed, only China increased the incidence of non-tariff 
barriers during the period under study. Indonesia represents the most 
surprising decline, as it reduced the incidence of non-tariff barriers from 
94.7% in the period from 1984-87 to 2.7% in the period from 1991-93. 
Although not included in the table due to a lack of comparable data, Korea 
 
 
 26. Data collected from PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION COUNCIL, SURVEY OF IMPEDIMENTS 
TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE APEC REGION (1995). 
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reportedly also reduced its tariff rates and the incidence of non-tariff 
barriers in the period from 1988 to 1993.27 An analysis of import regimes 
in more recent years by Ippei Yamazawa and Shujiro Urata indicates the 
continued trade liberalization by many APEC members.28 Although the 
economic crisis slowed the pace of trade liberalization, only a few cases of 
backtracking exist. 
D.  FDI Liberalization 
Inward FDI arguably contributes to the economic development of the 
recipient or host country through various channels. FDI provides a conduit 
for financial resources and technological and management know-how to 
pass from the multinationals to the FDI host country. Financial resources 
stimulate economic growth by expanding productive capacity, while 
technological and management know-how contribute by improving 
technical efficiency. Furthermore, FDI contributes to improvements in the 
technical efficiency of local firms by introducing competitive pressures. 
Despite the wealth of literature regarding the impact of inward FDI on 
the host country, no readily available study has examined the impact of 
inward FDI on promoting either competition or technical efficiency 
through increased competition. Many studies have investigated the impact 
of FDI on the technical efficiency of the host country’s firms, but they 
focus on the transfer of technology and not on enhanced competition. 
Many argue that “technology spillover”—transfers of technology from 
multinationals to local firms—occur through various channels. Local 
workers that acquire technologies by working at multinational firms may 
transfer those technologies to local firms as they move from the 
multinational firms to the local firms. Local firms may acquire 
technologies possessed by multinationals by imitating the production and 
other processes conducted by multinational firms. Although studies on the 
impact of multinationals on the technological efficiency of the host 
country focus on the transfer of technology, it is likely that the presence of 
multinationals would improve the technical efficiency of the host by 
promoting competition in the host country. 
While the empirical studies on the impact of FDI specifically examine 
the presence or absence of technology spillovers, in light of FDI’s possible 
 27. For Korea the unweighted average of tariff rates declined from 19.2% to 11.6% between 
1988 and 1993, while the incidence of non-tariff barriers declined from 9.0% to 1.7% during the same 
period. Id. at 8. 
 28. Yamazawa & Urata, supra note 13, at 64-67. 
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impact on competitive pressures affecting local firms, these studies also 
may reflect the presence or absence of competitive pressures from 
multinationals on local firms. The results of the analyses on the presence 
of technology spillover are mixed. Using industry-level data, Richard 
Caves found the presence of technology spillover in his study of the 
Australian manufacturing sector but not in his study of the Canadian 
manufacturing sector.29 Using similar methodology, Steven Globerman 
identified the spillover effect of FDI in the Canadian manufacturing 
sector.30 Both Magnus Blomström and Hakan Persson,31 and Blomström 
and Edward Wolff32 detected technology spillover in their studies of the 
Mexican manufacturing sector. 
These earlier studies exhibited one common shortcoming: they failed to 
account for differences in productivity across domestic industries. 
Controlling differences in productivity across industries by utilizing firm-
level data, Mona Haddad and Ann Harrison,33 and Brian Aitken and 
Harrison34 found no technological spillover in their respective studies of 
Morocco and Venezuela. The limited presence of foreign firms in these 
countries may explain their inability to detect technology spillover. 
Recognizing that multinational firms play an important role in 
promoting competition in host economies shifts the focus to the openness 
of FDI regimes of the developing APEC member economies, which I 
examined by using the following twelve policy areas: (1) right of 
establishment; (2) screening and examination; (3) most favored nation 
(MFN) treatment; (4) profit repatriation; (5) work permits; (6) taxation; (7) 
performance requirements; (8) investor behavior; (9) investor protection; 
(10) dispute settlement; (11) investment incentives; and (12) capital 
exports.  
These policy areas may be divided into three groups. The first group 
consists of policies that restrict investment by foreign firms, which 
 29. Richard E. Caves, Multinational Firms, Competition, and Productivity in Host-Country 
Industries, 41 ECONOMICA 176, 176-93 (1974). 
 30. Steven Globerman, Foreign Direct Investment and ‘Spillover’ Efficiency Benefits in 
Canadian Manufacturing Industries, 12 CAN. J. ECON. 42, 53 (1979). 
 31. Magnus Blomström & Hakan Persson, Foreign Investment and Spillover Efficiency in an 
Underdeveloped Economy: Evidence from the Mexican Manufacturing Industry, 11 WORLD DEV. 493, 
493-501 (1983). 
 32. Magnus Blomström & Edward N. Wolff, Multinational Corporations and Productivity 
Convergence in Mexico, in CONVERGENCE OF PRODUCTIVITY: CROSS-NATIONAL STUDIES AND 
HISTORICAL EVIDENCE 274-75 (William J. Baumol et al. eds., 1994). 
 33. Mona Haddad & Ann Harrison, Are There Positive Spillovers from Direct Foreign 
Investment? Evidence from Panel Data for Morocco, 42 J. DEV. ECON. 51, 60-70 (1993). 
 
 34. Brian J. Aitken & Ann E. Harrison, Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign 
Investment? Evidence from Venezuela, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 605 (1999).  
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includes the right of establishment, screening and examination, and MFN 
treatment. The right of establishment remains the largest potential 
impediment, as the denial of this right prevents foreign multinationals 
from undertaking FDI. The second group consists of policies that restrict 
the behavior of multinationals in the host country after they undertake 
FDI, namely profit repatriation, work permits, taxation, performance 
requirements, investor behavior, investor protection, and dispute 
settlement. The third group, which consists of investment incentives and 
capital exports, influences FDI by distorting the decisions and behavior of 
multinationals. For example, investment incentives may cause “round 
tripping” of FDI, as domestic investors seek to take advantage of such 
incentive measures by making it appear as if FDI originates from outside 
the host economy. 
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Table 4: Assessment of FDI Regimes35 
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Full score  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Australia  6 8 10 10 8 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 
Brunei  4 6 0 10 8 10 10 0 0 0 0 10 
Canada  8 8 0 10 10 10 0 10 8 10 10 10 
Chile  4 6 10 6 8 8 8 10 8 10 10 10 
China  2 6 10 2 6 6 8 10 8 8 8 6 
Hong Kong 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 
Indonesia  2 6 10 0 6 10 8 8 8 8 6 0 
Japan  6 8 10 10 8 10 10 10 8 10 8 10 
Korea  4 6 10 8 8 10 10 10 8 10 6 8 
Malaysia  4 6 10 8 8 10 8 0 8 10 6 10 
Mexico  4 6 8 10 8 10 8 10 8 10 8 10 
New Zealand 8 8 10 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
PNG  6 8 10 8 6 10 8 0 8 8 10 8 
Philippines  6 8 0 10 6 8 6 0 8 8 8 0 
Taipei  6 8 8 8 8 8 8 10 8 8 6 8 
Thailand  4 8 8 10 8 8 6 10 8 8 10 8 
U.S.A  8 10 8 8 8 10 10 0 8 10 8 10 
Average  5.4 7.6 7.9 8.2 7.8 9.3 8.2 7.1 6.8 8.7 7.9 8.2 
Notes: 1) Scoring takes the values from 0 to 10, with 10 being full liberalization and 0 being 
“not  mentioned” in the sources used for the analysis. 
           2) Total is obtained by summing all the scores with the “right of establishment” 
having 10 as a weight and other items having 1 as a weight. 
 
Table 4 reports the results of the assessment of the FDI regimes for 
developing Asian APEC member economies as compared to other selected 
APEC member economies. For each policy area, the full score is ten. 
Considering the extreme importance of the right of establishment in 
influencing FDI, the score for the right of establishment receives the 
weight of ten.36 Among developing Asian APEC member economies, 
Singapore and Hong Kong exhibit high total scores, which both exceed 
eighty points. Indeed, developing APEC members posses more open FDI 
 
 
 35. Data collected from APEC Committee on Trade and Investment, Guide to the Investment 
Regime of the APEC Member Economies (3d ed. 1996). 
 36. Note that in Table 4, for the economies that did not report the characteristics of particular 
FDI policy items regimes, the score has a value of zero. 
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regimes than developed members. Indonesia and China scored the lowest, 
while the scores for the other developing economies lie in-between these 
two groups. The right of establishment accounts for much of this 
difference in scores. China and Indonesia score as low as two points 
because they close off a substantial portion of their economies to FDI. In 
addition to the right of establishment, performance requirements also 
account for some variations among the sample economies. 
This assessment of APEC’s FDI regimes shows that significant 
impediments to FDI still exist for a number of developing economies. This 
remains true despite evidence that APEC members exerted significant 
liberalization efforts in FDI regimes.37  
In discussing the favorable impact of FDI on its recipient country, this 
analysis examines impediments to FDI with a view that such impediments 
produce inefficiency in the host country. However, FDI may yield 
undesirable consequences if a multinational firm with market power 
exercises anticompetitive practices. Indeed, this is exactly why countries 
need competition policies to deal with anticompetitive behavior of 
competitive multinational firms. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the recognition that competition is an important mechanism 
for promoting economic development, this analysis examined the current 
status of pro-competitive policies within selected developing APEC 
members in East Asia, including competition law, deregulation, and trade 
and FDI liberalization. This study discovered an encouraging policy trend 
toward greater competition in the countries under study, but the need to 
strengthen pro-competitive policies remains. In addition, substantial 
differences exist in the content of these countries’ policies, thereby 
reflecting diversity in both the levels of economic development and the 
social and historical backgrounds. 
Despite the importance of promoting competition for achieving 
economic development, it is difficult and undesirable for APEC members 
to adopt a uniform set of competition rules to achieve the goal of greater 
competition due to a wide diversity in their levels of economic 
development. It therefore is important for these countries to adopt a broad, 
flexible approach to formulating and implementing competition policies 
that consists solely of basic principles. In response to this need, the Pacific 
 37. See Yamazawa & Urata, supra note 13, at 67. 
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Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) developed its Competition 
Principles, which APEC leaders endorsed in Auckland in 1999.38 
The core axioms in the PECC Competition Principles are 
comprehensiveness, transparency, accountability, and non-discrimination. 
Comprehensiveness indicates the importance of a competition dimension 
to all policymaking that affects economic activities, while transparency 
ensures clarity in the application of the Competition Principles. Members 
should account for any departure from the Competition Principles, which 
they should apply in a non-discriminatory manner once a transition period 
is complete. 
Several basic measures would give effect to these core principles, 
including both reevaluating all relevant government legislation and 
regulations to ascertain the extent to which they distort competition and 
promoting competition by minimizing the risk of anticompetitive conduct 
through appropriate competition discipline on business conduct. The 
Competition Principles also emphasize the importance of international 
cooperation among both competition agencies and authorities for dealing 
with ever-increasing cross-border issues and capacity building in 
developing APEC members. 
The Competition Principles should serve an important role in 
formulating and implementing competition policies. However, their non-
binding nature remains problematic. Although non-binding principles are 
consistent with APEC’s voluntarism in pursing competitive environments, 
they may prove ineffective. In order for APEC members to promote 
voluntarily competition and set binding principles, it is important to 
discern the impact of increased competition on economies, which is a task 
that remains the responsibility of researchers.  
 38. PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION COUNCIL, PECC PRINCIPLES FOR GUIDING THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPETITION-DRIVEN POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR APEC ECONOMIES (1999). 
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